Spatial Patterns of Municipal Annexation and the Impact on the Cost of Police Services by DeMaria, Kyle B.
W&M ScholarWorks 
Undergraduate Honors Theses Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
4-2015 
Spatial Patterns of Municipal Annexation and the Impact on the 
Cost of Police Services 
Kyle B. DeMaria 
College of William and Mary 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses 
 Part of the Econometrics Commons, Geographic Information Sciences Commons, Human Geography 
Commons, Regional Economics Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons 
Recommended Citation 
DeMaria, Kyle B., "Spatial Patterns of Municipal Annexation and the Impact on the Cost of Police Services" 
(2015). Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 130. 
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses/130 
This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at 
W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors Theses by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spatial Patterns of Municipal Annexation and the 
Impact on the Cost of Police Services 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement 
for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies from 
The College of William and Mary 
 
by 
Kyle Bradford DeMaria 
 
Accepted for __________________________ 
 (Honors) 
 
_______________________________ 
 Dr. Peter McHenry (Economics) 
 Director 
 
_______________________________ 
 Dr. Rui Pereira (Economics) 
 
_______________________________ 
 Dr. Sibel Zandi-Sayek (Art & Art History) 
 
 
 
Williamsburg, Virginia 
April 24, 2015
ii 
 
Spatial Patterns of Municipal Annexation and the 
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Abstract     In cities with ample space to expand, municipal annexation is a versatile 
urban growth management tool because it can direct the location of future land 
development and population growth.  However, limited research has addressed the cost 
of providing public services, specifically police services, in cities which have undergone 
varying spatial forms of municipal annexation.  In this thesis, I test the hypothesis that 
there are costs associated with increasingly spatially fragmented forms of annexation.  I 
perform regression analysis on two spatial descriptors of non-compact boundaries using 
a national sample of 119 United States cities for the period 1990 to 2010.  The sample 
includes cities which exhibited a high areal growth rate exceeding 5% and a population 
threshold of at least 75,000 inhabitants across the study period.  When controlling for 
both city-specific factors and national trends in police expenditure, I found no 
association at the 10% significance level to support a relationship between fragmented 
annexation and the costs of police services.  This research shows that criticisms of 
fragmented patterns of annexation cannot be justified solely on the basis of increased 
police service costs. 
Keywords: annexation, public services, urban form 
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I. Introduction 
In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, urban planners and 
architects alike warned that certain spatial patterns of urban growth could contribute to 
widespread consequences for urban living and the environment.  A subset of these 
scholars demonstrated that patterns of low-density, expansive urban development 
indicative of urban sprawl could contribute to increased costs of public services.  
Municipal annexation, or the legal expansion of city boundaries, is an urban growth 
management tool because it can direct the location of land development and population 
growth by signaling to developers which lands will be extended the desirable public 
services of the central city (Kelly 2004, 79; Edwards 2008, 122; Landis 1992, 491).  
However, in certain cases, annexations have produced cities with non-compact 
boundaries.  These boundaries occasionally encapsulate territory not contiguous with 
the original city.  An emerging literature demonstrates that some of these histories of 
annexation have instigated or exacerbated problems of residential segregation in cities 
(Durst 2014; Lichter, Parisi, Grice, and Taquino 2007).  However, no research has 
investigated to what extent the spatial patterns of municipal annexation impact the costs 
of public services. 
This research investigates to what extent spatial patterns of annexation are 
associated with increased costs of police services.  I provide a background on municipal 
annexation in the United States, discuss in detail why the cost of police services could be 
expected to increase with non-compact forms of annexation, and test this hypothesis by 
performing a regression analysis on spatial descriptors of non-compact boundaries 
using a sample of United States cities for the period 1990 to 2010.  Finally, I present the 
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results, and conclude with a discussion of the implications for future urban planning 
initiatives. 
II. Background 
Municipal annexation, the legal expansion of city boundaries, is an important tool 
for the successful management of city growth because it directs the extension of valuable 
city services (Kelly 2004, 79; Edwards 2008, 122; Landis 1992, 491).  However, limited 
research investigates how different patterns of annexation impact the cost of providing 
those services.  In this section, I will provide background information on this issue.  First, 
I will briefly recount the history of municipal annexation in the United States.  Second, I 
will describe different patterns of annexation, and develop a vocabulary with which to 
describe these patterns.  Third, I will introduce a number of studies which have assessed 
the impact of patterns of urban sprawl on the cost of public services.  Unlike annexation, 
urban sprawl does not entail legal changes to boundaries, but is the spread of urban 
qualities to surrounding land.  Fourth, I will discuss the limited research investigating the 
impact of annexation on the cost of public services. 
A. A Brief History of Municipal Annexation in the United States 
The incidence of municipal annexation in the United States has varied throughout 
the 19th and 20th centuries (Jackson 1985, 149).  Following the Civil War, immigration 
and industrialization contributed to urban population growth and the physical expansion 
of cities, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest (Edwards 2008, 120).  At the 
beginning of the 20th century, city populations moved from center cities to locations on 
the fringe, a process known as centrifugal drift (McKenzie 1933, 173).  Consolidation, 
which is the fusion of two governments, and annexation ensured that regardless of 
centrifugal forces, populations remained within city limits.  Jackson notes that 
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consolidation and annexation were primarily responsible for the marked population 
growth of United States cities; instead of traditional forms of population change (i.e. 
births, deaths, and migration), annexation changed the boundaries of cities, and therefore 
those who were considered part of urban populations.  The 1854 consolidation of the City 
of Philadelphia with Philadelphia County quadrupled its population size and increased its 
territory from 2 to 130 square miles; this was the single largest annexation event in United 
States history in terms of percentage increase in area (Jackson 1985, 140-142).  However, 
between 1930 and the end of World War II, annexation was less commonly employed due 
to increasingly “stringent and cumbersome” annexation policies and state laws which 
favored the establishment of new governments on the fringes of cities over annexation 
(Edwards 2008, 120).  Counties began to offer greater baskets of public services to their 
residents, who preferred remaining county residents rather than inheriting the perceived 
problems of the city. (Jackson 1985, 149, 152-153; Edwards 2008, 120). 
Following World War II, annexation activity increased (Smith, Bromley, and 
Manton 1979, 933; Miller 1984, 31).  In fact, the frequency and magnitude of annexation 
was greater in the post-war years than at any time since 1800 (Bromley and Smith 1973, 
303).  Klaff and Fuguitt examined local governments with populations greater than 2,500 
between 1950 and 1970, and reported that the frequency of annexation was least in the 
Northeast (Klaff and Fuguitt 1978, 6).  Later, this regional discrepancy was explained by 
the fact that in the Northeast, most land belongs to already incorporated municipalities, 
and therefore the areal growth of one city must come at the loss of a surrounding 
municipality (Edwards 2008, 121).  Miller reported that in the 1970s, California, Florida, 
Illinois, and Texas accounted for 40% of all annexations (Miller 1984, 31).  Moreover, 58% 
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of all land annexed between 1990 and 2005 occurred in the South, followed by 25% in the 
West, 17% in the Midwest, and less than 1% in the Northeast (Edwards 2008, 120). 
The prevalence of annexation in United States urban history is understandable 
given the widespread benefits it offers to both the central city and surrounding 
unincorporated communities.  Importantly, annexation improves the fiscal health of 
central cities.  As central cities experience centrifugal drift, they still are required to 
provide services, such as police, fire, and ambulance, to those who commute into the city 
for work, yet they are not fully able to capture the revenue sources of the commuters.  
Annexation decreases the burden of the externality by including the commuters in the 
taxable population (MacManus and Thomas 1979, 17-18).  MacManus and Thomas found 
that cities which annexed greater land areas between 1970 and 1973 observed smaller 
growth rates in per capita taxes and reliance on short-term loans (MacManus and Thomas 
1979, 23).  Rusk similarly argued that a city’s fiscal health is positively correlated with its 
ability to annex by associating its Moody’s bond rating with its annexation growth rate 
(Rusk 2006, 6). 
Annexation is one possible means by which valuable city services, including 
schools, sewage, utilities, police, and fire, are provided to unincorporated fringe 
communities (Jackson 1985, 138).  In a study of 413 residents living immediately outside 
of Flint, Michigan, Kunkel observed that one’s opinion regarding the level of public 
services currently received is a significant determinant of one’s opinion regarding 
annexation.  Residents who expressed greater dissatisfaction with the quality of public 
services were more likely to support annexation by the central city (Kunkel 1960, 208-
209). 
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B. Patterns of Annexation and Associated Vocabulary 
John Friedmann has suggested three aspects of urbanization that represent 
conventional modes of thinking about cities as population, business, and cultural centers 
of human civilization (Friedmann 2002, 3).  An important, yet ignored, fourth aspect of 
urbanization relies on the legal definition of cities as determined by boundaries.  Through 
processes of annexation and incorporation, land becomes urban in the legal sense.  
Annexation is a legal mode of urbanization through which cities expand their boundaries 
to encapsulate surrounding land not part of a local government.  This surrounding land 
is considered unincorporated, and is usually administered by a higher level government 
such as a county.  Municipal consolidation occurs when two incorporated places merge; 
the traditional example is the unification of a city government with its county 
government.  From a spatial perspective, annexation and consolidation are similar events, 
as both lead to an increase in the areal size of the municipality.  I will treat annexation 
and consolidation as a single process, as they both contribute to the spatial urban growth 
of a city.1 
Scholars of urban sprawl have developed a vocabulary to describe patterns of 
urban spatial growth.  Two patterns of sprawl include strip development and leapfrog 
development.  Strip development is urban development along linear features such as 
commercial corridors or major transportation routes.  Leapfrog development is urban 
development which occurs at sites not contiguous to the city (Tsai 2005, 142).  With 
modification, this vocabulary is amenable to the discussion of annexation patterns.  First, 
                                                             
1 It is worthwhile to emphasize that annexation and consolidation are different processes, legally.  While 
annexation is the addition of unincorporated land, consolidation is the addition of incorporated land.  
Nonetheless, the term annexation is used to refer to both processes (Edwards 2008, 119; Brierly 2004, 
93).  This tradition will be followed here. 
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I use the term strip annexations to refer to annexations of linear features such as roads 
or commercial corridors.  Second, I employ the term leapfrog annexations to refer to 
annexations of land not contiguous to existing city boundaries.  In addition, I use the term 
shoestring annexations to refer to annexations of land not contiguous to the city, except 
for by a narrow strip of land (Sengstock 1960, 45; The Municipal Research and Services 
Center 2004, Ch. 9).  I will use the terms compact and fragmented to refer to a continuum 
of city shapes and annexation patterns ranging from simple polygons to patchy 
configurations.  Strip, leapfrog, and shoestring annexations, are characteristic of 
fragmented annexations. 
A comparison of the spatial growth of Charlotte, North Carolina (figure 1.A) and 
Houston, Texas (figure 1.B) provides an opportunity to use these descriptive terms in 
action.  Given the original extent of the city in 1990 depicted in light gray, annexations in 
the 1990s are depicted in medium gray, and annexations in the 2000s are depicted in 
dark gray.  Overall, Charlotte is more compact than Houston in that its annexations are 
contiguous to the city in 1990.  Houston exhibits a more fragmented pattern of annexation 
as indicated by the presence of strip and shoestring annexations.  Especially towards the 
north, the City of Houston has performed a number of strip annexations, incorporating 
several linear road features into the city.  In addition, it annexed a commercial strip to the 
north of the city, running in the southwest-northeast orientation.  The City of Houston 
also performed a shoestring annexation when incorporating the northeast community of 
Kingwood in the 1990s. 
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There are two forms of legislation which regulate possible patterns of annexation.  
In some states, all annexations must be contiguous with the existing city.  In several states, 
including Texas and North Carolina, zones of extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) define the 
radius around a city in which annexation may occur.  In Texas, for example, a city’s ETJ 
is determined by its population size such that larger cities are afforded larger ETJ radii. 
Nonetheless, some cities have attempted to circumvent these regulations.  For 
example, in 1949, Houston, Texas annexed a narrow, ten-foot strip of land alongside 
Pasadena’s southern and eastern borders in order to prevent Pasadena from annexing 
valuable land along the ship canal.  The narrow strip was legal because it was connected 
to Houston, thereby meeting the contiguity rule.  Furthermore, the annexation inhibited 
the future growth of Pasadena by limiting its supply of contiguous land (Thomas 1984, 
Figure 1. Comparison of the spatial growth patterns of Charlotte, North Carolina (A) 
and Houston, Texas (B).  For enhanced viewing, panels are not set to equal scale. 
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89-91).  In this case, Houston’s annexation was an example of a shoestring annexation.  
Houston’s tactics exemplify what Robert Thomas has termed the territorial imperative 
whereby municipalities annex strategically to preserve their ability to expand in the future 
(Thomas 1984, 84-85). 
C. Urban Sprawl and the Cost of Public Services 
Carruthers and Ulfarsson modeled the relationship between urban sprawl and per 
capita expenditure on 10 different public services for 283 counties between 1982 and 
1992, while controlling for socioeconomic factors and the degree of political 
fragmentation.  Urban sprawl was measured as the number of people plus jobs per acre 
of urbanized land, the number of developed acres per county, and total property value per 
acre of urban land.  All three measures of sprawl significantly affected per capita 
expenditure on police services, although only at the 10% level of significance.  While urban 
development and property value were positively associated with expenditure, density was 
negatively associated (Carruthers and Ulfarsson 2003, 508, 510, 513-517). 
 Hortas-Rico and Solé-Ollé performed a similar study in Spain examining the 
relationship between urban sprawl and the cost of public services in 2500 local 
municipalities in 2003.  They measured sprawl as urbanized land per capita.  They 
observed a non-linear relationship between urban sprawl and the cost of public services.  
The per capita expenditure for police services was greatest for very low and very high 
levels of sprawl.  The authors attribute this pattern to the substantial initial fixed costs of 
new development and later, high costs associated with the provision of services in 
spatially expansive regions (Hortas-Rico and Solé-Ollé 2010, 1519, 1522, 1535-1536). 
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 More recently, Lieske et al. significantly contributed to the literature by using a 
spatially explicit measure of the pattern of urban sprawl.  Using data from Albany County, 
Wyoming, home to the City of Laramie, for the years 1990 to 2007, the authors employed 
a global Moran’s I statistic to capture the degree of clustering or dispersion of residential 
parcels.  The authors observed a positive significant relationship between the degree of 
dispersion and the cost of police services, when controlling for other determinants of cost 
such as number of law enforcement officers.  In addition, they observed that the cost of 
police services increased at an increasing rate with greater dispersion of residential 
development (Lieske, McLeod, Coupal, and Srivastava 2012, 159-160, 166-167). 
D. Municipal Annexation and the Cost of Public Services 
The literature investigating the relationship between annexation and the cost of 
public services primarily addresses the effect of annexation on the degree of competition 
and inefficiency in the market for governmentally-provided public services.  Charles 
Tiebout’s mid-20th century Theory of Local Expenditure challenges the understanding 
that local public goods are inefficiently allocated in the context of a market economy 
because the public demand cannot be identified (Dowding, John, and Biggs 1994, 767-
768).  Although it is impossible to determine the demand for national defense, it is 
possible to ascertain the consumer-voter’s demand for municipal services; that preference 
is expressed through the choice of which municipality in which to live (Tiebout 1956, 418).  
Consumer-voters will locate in a municipality that provides a bundle of public goods that 
maximizes their utility (Tiebout 1956, 422).  A consumer-voter is better able to maximize 
utility in regions where there are a greater number of governments with greater diversity 
between them (Tiebout 1956, 418).  Annexation inhibits competition in two ways.  First, 
annexation expands the territory of a city and therefore reduces the land available for new 
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incorporations.  Second, as the spatial extent of the city increases, the city’s monopolistic 
power is enhanced (Mehay 1981, 54). 
A number of scholars have hypothesized that the tendency towards monopoly that 
results from annexation will lead to inefficiently large public service expenditures.  These 
scholars treat the 1963 Knox-Nisbet Act in California as a natural experiment which can 
address this question.  The act created Local Agency Formation Commissions (LAFCOs) 
in all California counties except San Francisco, and delegated to these commissions the 
authority to accept or reject proposed incorporations, annexations, consolidations, and 
dissolutions.  In the subsequent three years, there was a shift from incorporation to 
annexation; while the number of new incorporations decreased, 98% of annexation 
proposals were approved (Mehay 1981, 53-54).  Mehay observed that between 1963 and 
1970, cities which annexed a larger number of people also experienced a greater increase 
in spending on police and fire services, while controlling for changes in population density 
and intergovernmental aid, amongst other factors.  Mehay concluded that annexation 
enhances service monopolies and associated spending inefficiencies (Mehay 1981, 59-60). 
Liner challenged Mehay’s econometric model and interpretation of findings.  First, 
Liner argued that Mehay should have employed per capita measures of expenditure 
because annexation would be expected to increase total spending on public services.  
Second, demonstrating a significant positive relationship between spending growth and 
annexation rates does not adequately support the monopolization hypothesis.  In order 
to demonstrate that relationship sufficiently, a better measure of inefficiency must be 
included.  Liner suggested using per capita government employment.  When changing 
from total expenditure to per capita expenditure, Liner found that annexation was 
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negatively associated with per capita spending.  Liner concluded that there were two 
possible interpretations of this result: per capita expenditure and taxation decreased with 
higher rates of annexation, or there was a “thinning” of service with higher annexation 
rates (Liner 1992, 76, 82). 
A separate investigation by Ladd shed light on the discrepancy between Mehay’s 
and Liner’s findings.  Ladd investigated the effect of county population density and 
population growth rates on per capita expenditures on public safety for 247 counties in 
1985.  Instead of treating density as a continuous variable, she included 10 dummy 
variables of increasing population density.  She observed that density exerts a significant 
positive, “U-shaped” effect on expenditure; the magnitude of the effect of density on 
expenditure is greatest amongst counties with very low and very high densities (Ladd 
1992, 274, 277, 279, 288-291). 
Liner and McGregor developed the implications of a “U-shaped” relationship by 
suggesting that an optimal annexation rate might be possible.  At this optimal point, the 
growth rate of both per capita municipal taxation and expenditure would be minimized.  
With a sample of 450 municipalities for the time interval 1970-1980, they separately 
modeled annexation, taxation, and expenditure.  In the taxation and expenditure models, 
the variables of interest were the percentage change in municipal land area due to 
annexation and its squared value.  By substituting the mean values for the control 
variables, they were able to solve both the taxation and expenditure equations for an 
optimal annexation rate.  They concluded that the optimal annexation rate for the 
municipalities in this study ranged from 78% (taxation) to 93% (expenditure).  
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Interestingly, the mean annexation rate amongst annexing municipalities in his study was 
only 33% (Liner and McGregor 2002, 1478, 1482-1484). 
E. Advancing the Research Frontier 
Patterns of annexation in the United States can take a diversity of spatial 
configurations, some of which are more geometrically compact than others.  The 
literature investigating the effect of urban sprawl on the cost of public safety has 
increasingly found patterns of urban growth to be significant determinants of 
expenditure.  However, this literature consistently defines urban growth in non-legal 
terms, frequently employing measures of population density or area of developed land.  
There is great debate amongst scholars regarding which of these measures best captures 
growth.  This thesis is innovative in that it conceptualizes urban growth unambiguously 
by examining annexation, a legally-defined mode of urban growth.  This innovation is an 
important contribution to the literature because in most cases, the service areas of local 
police services are coincident with the legal city boundaries. 
 In this thesis, I investigate whether the spatial pattern of municipal annexation 
significantly impacts local expenditure on police services in 119 United States cities 
between 1990 and 2010.  Recognizing the findings from the urban sprawl literature, I 
believe there are costs associated with fragmented patterns of annexation, most 
frequently exhibited in leapfrog, strip, and shoestring forms.  With increasing non-
compact geometric forms of annexation, local governments incur costs due to the 
inaccessibility of isolated locations and spillovers of service to areas outside city limits.  
This thesis will investigate this question, while controlling for other important 
determinants of expenditure including population, population density, and property tax. 
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III. Theory 
There are two mechanisms by which fragmented patterns of annexation could 
potentially increase the cost of police services.  First, spillovers of service can occur 
whereby police are called to locations outside the city where populations do not pay for 
city services.  The spillover mechanism is founded on the Suburban-Central City 
Exploitation Thesis which suggests that suburban residents receive the positive 
externalities of living near a city without paying for those benefits  (Neenan 1970, 117).  
Spillovers occur in all cities to a certain extent, regardless of their degree of fragmentation, 
but spillovers theoretically are more likely in regions where boundaries are complex.  
Complex city boundaries are associated with large city perimeters, a factor which increase 
the spatial interaction between cities and their surroundings, as adjacency is maximized. 
Scholars in the field of landscape ecology had previously developed a plethora of 
landscape metrics to quantitatively describe the geometric features of ecological habitats 
(Turner 1989; Haines-Young and Chopping 1996).  More recently, urban geographers 
have adapted these metrics to describe patterns of urbanized regions (Irwin 2007; Herold 
2005).  One metric particularly well-suited to capturing the boundary complexity of 
fragmented annexations is the shape index (Patton 1975).  If a city at any point in time is 
conceptualized as a polygon, the shape index is defined as the perimeter of the polygon 
divided by the perimeter of the square whose area is equal to that of the polygon.  Because 
fragmented annexations have perimeters disproportionately large relative to their areas, 
the shape index captures the presence of strip, shoestring, and leapfrog annexations.  An 
increase in the value of a city’s shape index across time represents increasing complexity 
of the city’s boundary due to annexation activity.  While cities have discernable features 
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indicative of fragmented patterns of annexation (i.e. shoestring, strip, and leapfrog), the 
underlying assumption is that cities occur along a spectrum from more compact to more 
fragmented spatial configurations. 
The second mechanism is founded on the premise that fragmented annexations 
incorporate geographically isolated territory into the city limits.  This is because 
fragmented annexations incorporate greater areas of land not contiguous to the city than 
do compact annexations.  As a result, police departments serving fragmented annexations 
would likely incur greater transportation costs than those serving compact annexations.  
Whereas with compact annexations existing police officers could be rerouted to service a 
larger area, leapfrog and shoestring annexations would likely require new police stations, 
additional officers, and increased gas consumption. 
Given that the locations of police stations are fixed, a city’s road network is the 
primary determinant of the functional integration of these fragmented annexations.  
Fragmented annexations which are not well integrated into the city’s road network are 
likely to increase the cost of providing police services.  The degree of  connectivity of 
annexed land can be measured by comparing the average drive distances within each city 
for the years in the panel, standardizing by the city’s area.  Changes in this value over time 
represent changes in the accessibility of places within cities due to annexation or 
deannexation events.  A city’s drive distance will increase to a greater extent in cities 
performing fragmented annexations than in cities performing compact annexations, 
when standardizing for total area.  In order to improve the efficiency of calculating the 
drive distance measure for 119 cities in 3 time periods, I developed a proxy measure which 
strongly correlates with average drive distance.  Instead of using roads in the calculation, 
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I calculate the average distance from the geographic center of the city to all points within 
the city.  I refer to this variable as the accessibility measure, or average distance from 
center. 
Given these two mechanisms, I hypothesize that fragmented patterns of 
annexation increase per capita expenditure on police services due to the increased 
potential for spillovers of service and the relative inaccessibility of fragmented 
annexations. 
To investigate cost-incurring effects of fragmented annexation patterns, I 
examined a sample of 119 United States cities for the years 1990, 2000, and 2010.  I 
performed a panel regression with city fixed effects.  The fixed effects strategy controls for 
both observable and unobservable city-level, time-invariant effects on expenditure such 
as municipal spending efficiency and taxation levels.  The remaining variation in per 
capita expenditure could then be explained by time variant factors such as changes in city 
boundaries and accessibility due to annexation, as well as city income from property tax 
and demographics.  In a similar strategy, I included time fixed effects to examine if 
changes in per capita expenditure of police services are due to the two primary variables 
or, rather, due to general increases in spending on police services over time.  The following 
equation represents the primary specification, where i indexes cities, t indexes time, X is 
a vector of city-level controls, 𝛼𝑖 are city-level fixed effects, 𝜏𝑡  are decadal time fixed 
effects, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is the idiosyncratic error term. 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  
16 
 
Coefficient estimates on the city shape and accessibility variables will permit an 
estimation of the cost of fragmented patterns of annexation in large U.S. cities. 
The regression specification “pools” the panel data so that there are a total of 357 
observations, with each city contributing 3 observations.  One assumption of ordinary 
least squares regression is that the idiosyncratic error term, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 , be independently and 
identically distributed.  This is the case under random sampling where observations are 
independent from one another.  However, the assumption is violated in this case where 
sets of 3 observations derive from the same city.  Correlations amongst the error terms 
can produce falsely small standard errors and p-values (Cameron and Miller 2013, 2).  To 
mitigate this problem, I perform all regressions with city-level, cluster-robust standard 
errors. 
IV. Data 
A. Sample Selection 
The United States Census Bureau’s Boundary and Annexation Survey (BAS) 
collects annual data on legal boundary changes to incorporated places in the United 
States.  Since 1988, the survey has been administered to all incorporated places, and while 
response is voluntary, the BAS has achieved a response rate greater than 95% (Miller 
1988, 59).  The data collected as part of the BAS are then used annually to update the 
Census’s TIGER database, which stores historical GIS data on statistical and legal 
boundaries, as well as road and water features (Facer 2006, 699; Census Bureau 2015). 
In order to obtain a list of United States cities for which I would have GIS boundary 
data, I employed the Census’s TIGER Place files from 1990, 2000, and 2010, obtained 
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from the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS).  For each city with 
available GIS data, I calculated the spatial elasticity between 1990 and 2010.  Modifying 
the concept of spatial elasticity employed by the Brookings Institution’s David Rusk, I 
defined spatial elasticity as a city’s areal growth rate relative to a base year.  Using this 
procedure, I obtained 128 cities with population greater than 75,000 inhabitants and with 
a spatial elasticity greater than 5%. 
I chose a 5% spatial elasticity threshold to ensure that the territorial growth 
observed was due to annexation activity and not due to the quality of the spatial data.  The 
Census Bureau has consistently improved the positional accuracy of its GIS data since 
1990 (NHGIS 2015).  While this benefits current mapping projects, researchers 
conducting historical GIS analysis are challenged by the fact that layers from earlier years 
may not align well with layers from later years.  It is plausible that changes in city 
boundaries may be due to improved positional accuracy of coordinates, and not due to 
boundary changes.  I encountered this problem when working with the GIS data.  
However, I argue that my research design mitigates error due to misaligned layers.  I only 
include cities which have a spatial elasticity of 5%, which excludes any cities whose 
boundary changes were minor and therefore likely due to minor spatial misalignments. 
Originally, I did not intend to use a population threshold to limit the sample.  
However, the sample consisted of very small towns, both in terms of area and population, 
and this conflicted with the goal of examining annexation in large cities.  The small towns 
possessed very large spatial elasticities due to their small territorial extent in 1990.  For 
example, the town of Angel Fire, New Mexico, with a 2010 population of 1,216 inhabitants, 
possessed the highest calculated elasticity score of 111.81 from annexing surrounding 
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forested land more than 100 times its size of 164 acres in 1990.  A population threshold 
of 75,000 inhabitants ensured that the sample would contain high annexing 
municipalities with sizeable populations in urban areas. 
Lastly, I removed Fall River, Massachusetts, Miami Beach, Florida, and the New 
Jersey cities of Trenton and Camden because of a discrepancy between the GIS data 
indicating they had annexed land and the BAS tabular data indicating they had not.2  I 
also removed Lafayette, Louisiana, Columbia, Maryland, and the California cities of 
Thousand Oaks, Lancaster, Santa Clarita, and Rancho Cucamonga because they do not 
provide their own police services.  In figure 2, I depict the 119 cities in the sample with 
graduated symbols representing each city’s percentile within the distribution of observed 
                                                             
2 While the BAS tabular data and the TIGER shapefiles are intended to reflect one another, Fall River, 
Miami Beach, Trenton, and Camden are exceptions.  This is primarily because each of these cities is 
located adjacent to a river, and these cities’ GIS layers indicated they annexed substantial water regions, 
thereby artificially inflating their spatial elasticities.  By cross-validating with the tabular BAS dataset, I 
was able to identify this problem.  Amongst the remaining coastal cities in the sample, I found no others 
which were erroneously in the sample. 
Figure 2. Spatial distribution of sample cities with proportional 
symbols representing variation in spatial elasticity. 
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spatial elasticities.  The cities with the largest spatial elasticities occur in most of the states 
sampled, with concentrations of highly-elastic cities in California and North Carolina.  
Table 1 records the sample cities with the 20 largest spatial elasticities.  The complete list 
of cities can be found in appendix A. 
B. Shape Index 
If a city’s territory in a given year is conceptualized as a polygon, the shape index 
describing that city is measured as the perimeter of the polygon divided by the 
perimeter of the square whose area is equal to that of the polygon. 
Table 1. Subset of Complete Sample Ranked by Spatial Elasticity 
 City State Population, 2010 Elasticity Score 
1. Brownsville Texas 175,023 4.082 
2. Fayetteville North Carolina 200,564 2.569 
3. Laredo Texas 236,091 1.715 
4. Charleston South Carolina 120,083 1.516 
5. Joliet Illinois 147,433 1.237 
6. Winston-Salem North Carolina 229,617 0.864 
7. Reno Nevada 225,221 0.835 
8. Gainesville Florida 124,354 0.779 
9. Fort Wayne Indiana 253,691 0.765 
10. Chula Vista California 243,916 0.734 
11. Boise City Idaho 205,671 0.729 
12. Charlotte North Carolina 731,424 0.717 
13. Elgin Illinois 108,188 0.690 
14. Savannah Georgia 136,286 0.661 
15. Greensboro North Carolina 269,666 0.644 
16. Las Vegas Nevada 583,756 0.631 
17. Sioux Falls South Dakota 153,888 0.630 
18. Raleigh North Carolina 403,892 0.620 
19. Arvada Colorado 106,433 0.608 
20. Tallahassee Florida 181,376 0.607 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau; elasticity score calculated by author. 
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𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟
4√𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎
 
Because all that is required is the perimeter and area of the polygon, I calculated 
the shape index using the same Census TIGER Place files as used during the sample 
selection process.  The shape index is unitless.  Figure 3 demonstrates the success of the 
shape index at parsimoniously describing the complexity of city boundaries in a given 
Figure 3. Comparison of 2010 shape indices for cities with varying boundary 
complexities.  Charleston (A) and Ontario (D) depict the maximum and 
minimum value of the shape index in 2010, respectively.  Huntsville (B) and 
Laredo (C) occupy intermediary positions along the spectrum of observed 
shape indices.  For enhanced viewing, panels are not set to equal scale. 
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year.  Panels A and D depict the 2010 city boundaries for the city with the most 
fragmented and most compact forms, respectively.  In 2010, Charleston, South Carolina 
exhibited the largest shape index of any city in the sample, while Ontario, California was 
the most compact.  Panels B and C depict cities with intermediate shape indices.  Table 2 
contains the 20 cities from the sample with the largest shape indices.  
Table 2. Subset of Sample with 20 Largest Shape Indices in 2010 
 City State Population, 2010 Shape Index 
1. Charleston South Carolina 120,083 16.236 
2. Tuscaloosa Alabama 90,468 12.496 
3. Springfield Illinois 116,250 10.214 
4. Columbus Ohio 787,033 9.957 
5. Houston Texas 2,099,451 9.257 
6. Huntsville Alabama 180,105 8.959 
7. Joliet Illinois 147,433 8.834 
8. Knoxville Tennessee 178,874 8.459 
9. Corpus Christi Texas 305,215 8.178 
10. Raleigh North Carolina 403,892 7.943 
11. Pueblo Colorado 106,595 7.124 
12. Fort Worth Texas 741,206 6.801 
13. Durham North Carolina 228,330 6.492 
14. Greensboro North Carolina 269,666 6.405 
15. Columbia South Carolina 129,272 6.176 
16. Elgin Illinois 108,188 6.128 
17. Orlando Florida 238,300 6.076 
18. Eugene Oregon 156,185 6.021 
19. Austin Texas 790,390 5.922 
20. St. Petersburg Florida 244,769 5.652 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau; Author’s Calculations. 
 
C. Average Distance from Center 
The calculation of average drive distance requires data on city road networks for 
each year in the panel.  These data were obtained from the United State Census Bureau’s 
TIGER database for the years 1990, 2000, and 2010 because it is one of the few, if not 
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only, publicly-available roads network datasets available with the appropriate time 
coverage.  Before 2007, the Census Bureau distributed TIGER products in their TIGER 
Line format.  This format is obsolete and most GIS software will not recognize this format.  
I used the Geographic Data Abstraction Library’s (GDAL) “ogr2ogr” function to convert 
from TIGER to shapefile format, the latter of which is easily recognized with current GIS 
software.  Because of the expense of obtaining the historical locations of police stations 
for the national dataset, I chose to model police station locations using a single point 
located at the geographic center of the city.  In GIS theory, the center point is termed the 
centroid of the city polygon. 
First, using the Network Analyst Extension of ArcGIS, I calculated a multi-ring 
service area covering the entire extent of the city, for each city in the year 1990 (figure 
4.A).  Each consecutive ring in the service area, depicted in panel A by the increasingly 
red zones, approximates the region in the city to which it is possible to drive an additional 
mile from the centroid using roads.  The darkest red ring, indicating the 20-mile zone, 
demarcates the territory to which it is possible to drive between 19 and 20 miles from the 
centroid of the city.  Second, as shown in panel B, I performed a spatial intersection 
procedure on the multi-ring service area from panel A and the city’s polygon boundary in 
order to obtain the multi-ring service areas exclusively for the city, not including 
surrounding land.  Third, I calculated the mean of the drive distance increments, weighted 
by the proportion of city land belonging to each of the rings.  I use the term average drive 
distance to refer to this weighted average. 
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After obtaining the average drive distance for each city in the panel for the year 
1990, I recognized that continuing with this technique would be inefficient given the 
spatial and temporal scope of the panel.  Certain portions of the service area GIS workflow 
are not automatable.  In addition, in a number of cases, I recognized that I would need to 
download additional roads data to calculate service areas covering the entirety of cities.  
For these two reasons, I considered feasible alternatives which would capture the 
inaccessibility of fragmented locations. 
The alternative technique is analogous to the process previously described, except 
that it removes roads from the calculation.  As before, police station locations are modeled 
by the centroid of the city.  For each city and year pair in the panel, I generated a raster 
layer, essentially a gridded layer complete with cells, where each cell surrounding the 
Figure 4. Derivation of the average drive distance measure.  Panel A 
depicts the service area generated from roads as they existed in and 
around Austin, Texas in 1990.  Panel B depicts the result of only 
considering the service area rings that fall within Austin in 1990. 
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centroid measures the distance from the centroid to that cell (figure 5.A).  Panel A of figure 
5 depicts the resultant raster layer with a perfectly circular distance pattern.  Finally, I 
calculated the average value of the cells contained in the city (figure 5.B).  The final result 
is a substitute for the average drive distance, and I refer to it as the average distance from 
center. 
The average distance from center approach is a strong substitute for the average 
drive distance strategy.  Mathematically, the accuracy of the average drive distance 
calculation can be improved by decreasing the size of the service area increments 
surrounding the centroid.  As the increments become increasingly small, approaching 
Figure 5. Development of average distance from center measure.  Panel A 
depicts the generated distance raster surrounding the 1990 Austin city 
centroid.  Panel B depicts the results of only considering distances within 
Austin. 
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zero, the average drive distance approaches its true value.  This concept is analogous to 
that of a Riemann sum where calculating the area beneath a curve can be approximated 
with increasing accuracy by minimizing the width of the rectangles composing the curve.  
The average distance from center approach improves the accuracy of the average drive 
distance approach by capitalizing on this principle.  Spatially, the only distinction between 
the two approaches is the allocation of distances by the location of roads. 
Figure 6 depicts four cities with varying average distance from center measures 
using the same color scheme, but different geographic scales, to enhance comparability.  
As the distance data are stored as raster layers, each cell is assigned a color to represent 
distance from the centroid.  Blues indicate locations close to the centroid, and yellows, 
oranges, and reds indicate increasing distance from the centroid.  Houston, Texas ( figure 
6.A) has a larger average distance than Salinas, California, as indicated by the greens, 
yellows, and oranges absent for Salinas (figure 6.D).  Aurora, Colorado (figure 6.B) and 
Raleigh, North Carolina (figure 6.C) exhibit similar distance patterns, but Aurora has a 
larger average distance because it possesses distant locations in the northeast. 
To determine the appropriateness of using the distance from center approach as a 
substitute for the drive distance strategy, I calculated the correlation coefficient between 
the data obtained by the two methods for the year 1990.  When only considering the 94 
cities for which I calculated the average drive distance using complete road coverage, I 
obtained a correlation coefficient, r, of 0.975.3  This analysis validates the average distance 
from center strategy as a strong substitute for the average drive distance strategy. 
                                                             
3  I did obtain drive distance values for the remaining 25 cities in the sample.  However, they are biased by 
the fact that they were derived from roads layers which did not cover the entirety of the cities.  When 
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As would be expected, the average distance from center measure is strongly 
correlated with the geographic size of the city.  In order to remove the effect of city area, 
I divided the measure by the size of the city in acres.  In standardizing by area, a high 
average distance from center represents the presence of distant annexations, rather than 
simply a city with a large area.  Table 3 lists the 20 cities from the sample with the largest 
1990 area-standardized average distance from center statistics. 
                                                             
disregarding this bias, and including these 25 cities in the correlation analysis, the correlation coefficient 
remained constant at 0.970. 
Figure 6. Comparison of average drive distance measurements 
for cities in 1990. 
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D. Police Expenditure and Additional Variables 
In years ending in two and seven, the United States Census Bureau publishes the 
Census of Governments, a compendium of financial statistics for all state and local 
governments, including city governments.  In non-government-census years it collects 
financial statistics for cities with a population greater than 50,000 inhabitants.  Because 
all cities in the sample have a population greater than 75,000 inhabitants, I collected the 
total expenditure on police services and property tax revenue variables from the Census 
Table 3. Sample Cities with 20 Largest Area-Standardized Average Distance From 
Center Statistics in 1990 
 City State 
Average 
Distance From 
Center (mi) 
Acreage 
Area-
Standardized 
Distance 
(mi/acre) 
1. Whittier California 1.73 8,018.2 0.000215 
2. San Buenaventura California 2.40 13,179.6 0.000182 
3. Boulder Colorado 2.48 15,070.2 0.000165 
4. Kenosha Wisconsin 2.17 13,873.5 0.000156 
5. Hialeah Florida 1.96 12,635.7 0.000155 
6. Joliet Illinois 2.75 17,962.5 0.000153 
7. Visalia California 2.29 15,045.8 0.000152 
8. Oxnard California 2.30 15,615.0 0.000147 
9. Orange California 2.24 15,226.3 0.000147 
10. Arvada Colorado 2.08 14,228.7 0.000146 
11. Anaheim California 4.18 29,249.5 0.000143 
12. Salinas California 1.69 11,922.6 0.000141 
13. Naperville Illinois 2.48 17,955.5 0.000138 
14. Elgin Illinois 1.92 14,282.0 0.000134 
15. Fort Lauderdale Florida 2.79 20,844.9 0.000134 
16. Fontana California 3.05 22,811.9 0.000134 
17. Tuscaloosa Alabama 4.89 36,619.1 0.000133 
18. Chula Vista California 2.44 18,426.0 0.000133 
19. Santa Rosa California 2.87 21,720.7 0.000132 
20. Glendale Arizona 4.38 33,563.6 0.000131 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau; columns 4 and 6 calculated by author. 
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Bureau’s annual “unit” files.  Total expenditure includes both direct and 
intergovernmental expenditures.  The former includes spending on items such as officer 
salaries, construction of new buildings, and gas.  The latter includes payments made to 
other governmental units for services or goods received.  All financial data were originally 
recorded in nominal values, and were converted to 2010 dollars using the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis’s “Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross Inves tment 
Implicit Price” deflator. 
One possible problem with using city finance data is the potential for overlapping 
zones of influence.  The Census collects information on a wide range of “governments” 
including municipalities, transit authorities, special utility districts, and school districts.  
Metropolitan regions are complete with numerous government entities, with distinct 
funding structures and overlapping service zones, which might extend beyond the city.  
For example, a city’s water service might be provided through a public-private 
partnership which provides service to both city and suburban residents.  The city’s 
expenditures on water services cannot be directly tied to factors endemic to the city, 
because the firm provides service beyond the city.  The problem of overlapping service 
zones induces measurement bias in the expenditure dependent variable whereby there is 
not a one to one association between the cost of a service and a city’s expenditure on that 
service. 
The potential for this problem extends into the realm of police service; however I 
have taken several measures to mitigate measurement bias.  First, during the sample 
selection process, I removed those 6 cities from the sample which received police services 
from the county.  Second, municipal police services are more likely to be city-specific than 
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are other public services, due to jurisdictional authority.  Third, the current extent of the 
data do not permit a truly better alternative.  While several studies use county-data which 
are less fraught with the potential for overlapping zones of influence, the problem can still 
exist at that scale of analysis.  I argue that these research design mechanisms mitigate any 
measurement bias resulting from overlapping zones of influence. 
I obtained city populations from the United States Census Bureau records, 
archived at the NHGIS, and then used these population counts to derive per capita police 
expenditure and per capita property tax.  I obtained measures of city area from the Census 
Place files by calculating areas in a GIS.  I then used these areas to produce the population 
density and area-standardized average distance from center variables.  Table 4 presents 
summary statistics of the dependent variable and 5 independent variables employed in 
the study. 
Table 4. Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variable: Per Capita (US 2010$) 
Total Expenditure 239.46 229.79 74.29 72.16 624.89 
Independent Variables 
Shape Index 3.88 3.49 2.11 1.20 16.24 
Ln of Average 
Distance From 
Center1 
-9.37 -9.33 0.38 -10.44 -8.44 
Property Tax 
Per Capita 
(2010 US$) 
302.39 275.22 175.85 12.57 1098.30 
Ln of Population 12.06 11.92 .63 11.23 14.56 
Population Density 
(People/Acre) 
4.32 3.93 2.12 1.29 17.92 
1 Standardized by city area; units: miles per acre. 
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V. Results 
In this section, I test the hypothesis that fragmented patterns of annexation are 
associated with increased per capita spending on police services.  Table 5 presents the 
results of the regressions explaining per capita total police expenditures. 
Table 5. Regression Results of Total Expenditure 
 Per Capita Total Expenditure on Police Services, 2010 US$ 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Shape Index 5.63** 
(2.25) 
9.04** 
(3.72) 
8.42** 
(3.83) 
7.62** 
(3.19) 
1.99 
(2.64) 
Ln of Average 
Distance 
-3.46 
(14.63) 
-180.80*** 
(53.88) 
-73.25 
(83.64) 
-34.08 
(71.57) 
37.66 
(59.05) 
Ln of Population   66.78* 
(34.97) 
67.05** 
(33.58) 
-24.02 
(37.66) 
Population Density   -2.29 
(8.59) 
-3.67 
(7.49) 
-3.62 
(6.83) 
Per Capita 
Property Tax 
   0.22*** 
(0.047) 
0.17*** 
(0.053) 
2000     49.38*** 
(5.97) 
2010     59.71*** 
(9.17) 
Constant 185.20 
(139.00) 
-1490.70*** 
(499.00) 
-1275.00** 
(523.70) 
-967.30** 
(429.80) 
800.90* 
(411.50) 
City Fixed Effects      
Time Fixed Effects      
Adjusted-R2 0.02 0.15 0.17 0.28 0.44 
N 357 357 357 357 357 
Source: Author’s calculations.  Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1% 
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Model 1 presents a baseline specification where expenditure is modeled as a 
function of the shape index and the area-standardized average distance from center 
measure.  As hypothesized, the shape index is positively associated with per capita 
expenditures, and is statistically significant at the 5% level.  The average distance 
measure is negatively associated with per capita expenditure, in contrast to the 
hypothesized relationship, and is not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Models 2, 3, and 4 introduce the city-level fixed effects and gradually incorporate 
the population, population density, and property tax control variables.  The addition of 
city fixed effects controls for all city-level factors which do not vary over time.  By 
controlling for these factors, model 2 is able to explain an additional 13% of the variation 
in per capita total police expenditure from the baseline specification.  The shape index 
remains statistically significant at the 5% level, and its effect increases by $3.  Unlike in 
model 1, the average distance measure becomes statistically significant at the 1% level, 
but the magnitude of its negative effect on police expenditure increases. 
  Model 3 continues to employ city fixed effects and controls for the effects of 
changing population and population density within cities across time.  With the addition 
of the population controls, the magnitude and significance of the shape index remain 
constant, but the average distance measure’s effect lessens and becomes statistically 
insignificant at the 10% level.  The positive association of population and negative 
association of population density with per capita expenditure are consistent with the 
literature which suggests that expenditures increase with additional “consumers”, but 
decrease as “consumers” concentrate in locations (Carruthers and Ulfarsson 2003; 
Lieske, McLeod, Coupal, and Srivastava 2012; Ladd 1992).  However, the effect of 
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population density is not statistically distinguishable from zero.  The population 
measures are jointly significant at the 10% level, indicating they are collectively 
important controls when considering the effect of patterns of annexation on per capita 
expenditure on police services. 
Model 4 continues to employ city fixed effects and adds a control for per capita 
property tax revenue.    The shape index retains its significance at the 5% level and its 
positive association with per capita expenditure.  The average distance measure ’s effect 
decreases and remains statistically indistinguishable from zero.  Property tax is 
significant at the 1% level and is positively associated with per capita police expenditure, 
indicating that for each additional dollar earned in property tax, per capita police 
expenditure increases by $0.22. 
Model 5 is unique among the models presented in that it is the first to introduce 
time fixed effects, while maintaining city fixed effects and the previously-introduced 
controls.  The time effects capture a sizeable amount of the variation in per capita 
expenditures and are an important addition to the model.  The time effects are jointly 
significant at the 1% level, and together with the other factors in model 5, explain 44% of 
the variation in per capita police expenditure.  This is an increase of 16% from model 4 
with only city effects present.  I will use model 5 to estimate the effect of fragmented 
annexations on per capita police expenditure. 
The inclusion of the time effects impacts the magnitude, significance, and 
relationship of the estimated effects of the shape index and average distance measure.  
While the shape index was significant in previous models, the inclusion of the time 
effects renders the shape index insignificant at the 10% level, and the size of the effect 
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decreases substantially.  On average, a 1 unit increase in the shape index is associated 
with a $1.99 increase in per capita police expenditure, when controlling for city-level 
time-invariant factors, national-level time-variant factors, population controls, and 
property tax. 
Because the shape index itself is unitless, it is worthwhile to interpret the effect of 
increasingly complex city boundaries on per capita police expenditures.  Charleston, 
South Carolina and Knoxville, Tennessee exhibited the two largest increases in the 
shape index between 1990 and 2010 of cities in the sample.  Charleston’s shape index 
increased by 6.77 and Knoxville’s shape index increased by 5.73.  According to the 
results of model 5, when all other factors are held constant, Charleston would be 
predicted to increase its per capita police expenditure by $13.47 between 1990 and 2010 
due to the increasingly complex boundaries obtained through fragmented annexations.  
Likewise, Knoxville would be expected to increase its per capita police expenditure by 
$11.40 between 1990 and 2010 due to increasingly complex boundaries. 
In contrast, 36% of the cities in the sample exhibited a decrease in the shape 
index over time.  Interestingly, Austin, Texas, which observed the largest spatial 
elasticity between 1990 and 2010, also observed the greatest decrease in shape index 
over that same period.  Its shape index decreased by 1.54.  According to the estimates 
observed in model 5, Austin, Texas saved approximately $4.50 per capita in total 
expenditure on police services as a result of increasingly compact boundaries obtained 
through annexation. 
In model 5, the average distance measure remained insignificant at the 10% level 
and the magnitude of its effect remained approximately constant, but the observed 
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relationship changed signs.  Whereas previous models observed a negative relationship 
between average distance and per capita expenditure, model 5 observed a positive 
relationship.  This result is consistent with the hypothesized relationship, but because 
the 90% confidence interval spans both sides of 0, it is not possible to state with 
reasonable certainty whether the average distance from center measure is associated 
with increasing or decreasing per capita police expenditures.  Given that 95% of cities in 
the sample exhibited a decreasing average distance from center indicates that between 
1990 and 2010 cities annexed land which increased overall accessibility of regions 
within cities. 
It is meaningful to gauge the range of observed effects.  Fayetteville’s and 
Visalia’s non-area-standardized average distance measures decreased 2.08 and 0.30 
miles, respectively, between 1990 and 2010.  When standardizing by the city area at 
each point in time, Fayetteville and Visalia exhibited two of the largest decreases in the 
area-standardized average distance measure.  According to the results obtained in 
model 5, Fayetteville is estimated to have observed a $26.63 decrease in per capita 
police expenditure between 1990 and 2010 due to improved city accessibility as a result 
of annexation.  Likewise, Visalia is estimated to have observed an $11.64 decrease in per 
capita police expenditure over that same period due to improved city accessibility as a 
result of annexation. 
At the other end of the spectrum are the 5% of sample cities which exhibited an 
increase in the area-standardized average distance from center measure.  Tampa, 
Florida observed one of the largest increases in the area-standardized average distance 
measure of sample cities.  This amounted to an increase in the non-area standardized 
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measure of .61 miles.  According to the results obtained in model 5, Tampa is estimated 
to have observed an increase in per capita police expenditure of $1.59. 
VI. Discussion 
 
 This research represents a first attempt to estimate the cost of spatial patterns of 
annexation on per capita police expenditure.  While the two key measures intended to 
capture spatial patterns of annexation were not ultimately significant when both city 
and time fixed effects were present, the results obtained through analysis reveal several 
key findings. 
 First, while it is difficult to state with a reasonable level of certainty that per 
capita police expenditures are impacted by fragmented patterns of annexation, it is 
possible to state a range of estimated costs for the 119 cities in the sample.  Neither the 
shape index nor the average distance measure was ultimately significant at the 10% 
level.  This indicates that there is a 10% chance that one would reject the null hypothesis 
that fragmented patterns of annexation do not impact per capita police expenditures 
when in reality there is some true effect.  Given that this research is a first attempt at 
estimating the partial effects of complex boundaries and inaccessible annexations, it is 
reasonable to report the range of estimated costs of observed spatial patterns of 
annexation for cities in the sample.  Though it is important to note that these estimates 
possess large confidence intervals, and different samples would likely yield different 
estimates.  Charleston, South Carolina exhibited the greatest increase in the shape index 
with an estimated increase in police expenditure of $13.46 per resident.  Austin, Texas 
exhibited the greatest decrease in the shape index with an estimated savings in police 
expenditure of $3.07 per resident.  Hialeah, Florida exhibited the largest increase in the 
36 
 
average distance from center measure with an estimated increase in police expenditure 
of $2.10 per person.  Brownsville, Texas exhibited the greatest decrease in the average 
distance measure with an estimated savings in police expenditure of  $24.15 per person. 
Second, 95% of cities sampled exhibited a decrease in average distance from 
center, indicating that between 1990 and 2010, there was an increasing trend towards 
annexing land which was not geographically isolated.  64% of the cities sampled 
exhibited increasingly complex boundaries between 1990 and 2010. 
Third, the ambiguity of the sign on the average distance coefficient underscores 
the possibility that the interaction of land use with spatial patterns of annexation could 
better explain changes in police expenditure.  An important change induced by the 
inclusion of time fixed effects is the change in sign of the average distance from center 
measure.  I hypothesized that a greater average distance from center would result in 
higher per capita expenditures on police services due to the need for additional officers, 
new police stations, and greater gas consumption.  The insignificance of the average 
distance measure makes it difficult to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis of no 
effect, or know whether there is a positive or negative relationship.  However, it remains 
worthwhile to consider the situation in which geographically isolated annexations might 
result in a decrease in per capita expenditures on police services. 
In order for there to be a negative relationship, the annexation of increasingly 
distant territory would need to result in decreased per capita spending.  This outcome is 
possible if owners of the newly annexed land contribute property taxes, but demand 
little or no service.  This would be possible if the newly annexed land were undeveloped 
or uninhabited such that officers were rarely called to the territory and were not needed 
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there.  This is a possible outcome, given that land is often annexed prior to development.  
In these cases, annexation acts as a signal by which cities can indicate area they would 
like to develop and expand into.  Land use might be an important interaction term 
which would help explain whether geographically isolated annexed land demands police 
services. 
Fourth, the fact that highly significant time effects removed the significance of 
the shape index indicates that between 1990 and 2010 there were national increases in 
municipal police expenditures which likely inhibited the capacity of the regression 
model to detect any effect of fragmented patterns of annexation.  While the city fixed 
effects controlled for city-level, time-invariant factors, and conversion of finance data to 
real values removed the effect of inflation, the time effects captured national increasing 
trends in police expenditure at the turn of the 21st century.  In 1982, President Ronald 
Reagan declared a “War on Drugs” which precipitated the Comprehensive Crime Act of 
1984.  Following 1984, a sizeable portion of state and local law enforcement resources 
were positioned to remove drugs from the street (Benson, Rasmussen, and Sollars 1995, 
21).  Amongst spatially elastic, large-population cities in the U.S., per capita police 
expenditures increased, on average, by $49.38, or 24%, in the 1990s.  Following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, all levels of government increased service in order to prevent future 
attacks.  Amongst spatially elastic, large-population cities in the U.S., per capita police 
expenditures increased, on average, by $59.71, or by 24%, in the 2000s.  These spending 
waves spanning the last two decades help explain the highly significant effect of the time 
fixed effects. 
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The strength of the time fixed effects likely captured all temporal effects 
previously captured by the shape index and average distance measure.  While I 
cautiously collected the sample of cities to balance sample size with high annexing cities, 
it is possible that due to the sample size, the study is underpowered and unable to 
differentiate the effect of fragmented annexations from a general increasing trend in 
police expenditures in the 1990s and 2000s.  However, if cities with smaller populations 
were included, the sample would be composed of a different class of cities, more rural in 
composition and with high elasticities due to small 1990 areas.  When investigating the 
effect of fragmented patterns of annexation in highly-populated urban areas, there is a 
fundamental tradeoff between the power of the study and results which are 
generalizable to the population of interest. 
Future research should develop more precise estimates of the cost of fragmented 
forms of annexation on police services.  First, enlarging the sample to include smaller 
population cities might provide the variation needed in per capita police expenditure to 
separate an effect of fragmented patterns of annexation from increasing police 
expenditures.  However, the reference population would then include cities which vary 
substantially from one another in population and function, and generalizations to large 
metropolitan cities might not be possible.  Second, the interaction of land use with 
spatial patterns of annexation could improve the current understanding of the effect of 
fragmented annexations on per capita police expenditure.  In particular, it is possible 
that vacant or undeveloped plots of land may not require additional police resources.  
Given the cost and scarcity of historical municipal land use records, it would likely be 
most feasible to obtain remotely-sensed satellite data which can be converted into 
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predicted land uses, where the distinction between developed and undeveloped territory 
would be paramount.  Third, in this thesis, I only examine one public service, police 
protection, because jurisdictions are most likely to spatially align with city boundaries, 
and therefore evade the problem of overlapping zones of influence.  Nonetheless, it 
would be advantageous to examine how fragmented annexations impact city 
expenditures on other public services, such as fire protection and sewage. 
VII. Conclusion 
For cities with space to expand, municipal annexation is a versatile urban growth 
management tool because it can direct the location of future land development and 
population growth in metropolitan areas.  In this thesis, I tested the hypothesis that 
fragmented patterns of annexation increase the cost of providing police services due to 
geographic isolation and the increased potential for spillovers of service.  Performing a 
regression analysis controlling for both city-specific factors and national temporal 
trends in police spending, I found there was no statistically significant relationship 
between fragmented patterns of annexation and the cost of police services.  While 
criticisms of fragmented annexation based on the concern that it is associated with 
residential segregation exist, this research shows that criticisms of fragmented patterns 
cannot be justified solely on the basis of increased police service costs.  Future research 
should attempt to validate the results obtained in this thesis by examining other public 
services, increasing the sample size, and considering any interaction effect of land use. 
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Appendix A. Complete Research Sample. 
 
 City State Population (2010) Elasticity Score 
1. Brownsville TX 175,023 4.082 
2. Fayetteville NC 200,564 2.569 
3. Laredo TX 236,091 1.715 
4. Charleston SC 120,083 1.516 
5. Joliet IL 147,433 1.237 
6. Winston-Salem NC 229,617 0.864 
7. Reno NV 225,221 0.835 
8. Gainesville FL 124,354 0.779 
9. Fort Wayne IN 253,691 0.765 
10. Chula Vista CA 243,916 0.734 
11. Boise City ID 205,671 0.729 
12. Charlotte NC 731,424 0.717 
13. Elgin IL 108,188 0.690 
14. Savannah GA 136,286 0.661 
15. Greensboro NC 269,666 0.644 
16. Las Vegas NV 583,756 0.631 
17. Sioux Falls SD 153,888 0.630 
18. Raleigh NC 403,892 0.620 
19. Arvada CO 106,433 0.608 
20. Tallahassee FL 181,376 0.607 
21. Lawton OK 96,867 0.585 
22. Durham NC 228,330 0.560 
23. Irvine CA 212,375 0.559 
24. Bakersfield CA 347,483 0.543 
25. Visalia CA 124,442 0.543 
26. Orlando FL 238,300 0.539 
27. Pueblo CO 106,595 0.504 
28. McAllen TX 129,877 0.494 
29. Tucson AZ 520,116 0.449 
30. Albuquerque NM 545,852 0.428 
31. Lincoln NE 258,379 0.410 
32. Naperville IL 141,853 0.402 
33. Wichita KS 382,368 0.401 
34. San Antonio TX 1,327,407 0.383 
35. Corona CA 152,374 0.369 
36. Tyler TX 96,900 0.369 
37. Ontario CA 163,924 0.358 
38. Rockford IL 152,871 0.357 
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39. Austin TX 790,390 0.357 
40. Chandler AZ 236,123 0.354 
41. Overland Park KS 173,372 0.351 
42. Springfield IL 116,250 0.347 
43. Aurora IL 197,899 0.345 
44. Clarksville TN 132,929 0.334 
45. Wichita Falls TX 104,553 0.333 
46. Fort Collins CO 143,986 0.332 
47. Billings MT 104,170 0.331 
48. Knoxville TN 178,874 0.320 
49. Cedar Rapids IA 126,326 0.319 
50. Huntsville AL 180,105 0.277 
51. Madison WI 233,209 0.277 
52. Simi Valley CA 124,237 0.269 
53. Omaha NE 408,958 0.261 
54. Mesa AZ 439,041 0.260 
55. Bellevue WA 122,363 0.248 
56. Salinas CA 150,441 0.246 
57. Kenosha WI 99,218 0.245 
58. Phoenix AZ 1,445,632 0.233 
59. Tuscaloosa AL 90,468 0.230 
60. Santa Rosa CA 167,815 0.223 
61. Modesto CA 201,165 0.222 
62. Fort Worth TX 741,206 0.210 
63. Stockton CA 291,707 0.210 
64. Lafayette LA 120,623 0.205 
65. Springfield MO 159,498 0.200 
66. Mobile AL 195,111 0.196 
67. Memphis TN 646,889 0.194 
68. Montgomery AL 205,764 0.193 
69. Odessa TX 99,940 0.191 
70. Fontana CA 196,069 0.190 
71. Lubbock TX 229,573 0.185 
72. San Angelo TX 93,200 0.178 
73. Corpus Christi TX 305,215 0.178 
74. Little Rock AR 193,524 0.173 
75. Macon GA 91,351 0.171 
76. Aurora CO 325,078 0.171 
77. Whittier CA 85,331 0.171 
78. Peoria IL 115,007 0.165 
79. Waco TX 124,805 0.162 
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80. Hialeah FL 224,669 0.157 
81. Columbus OH 787,033 0.156 
82. Kansas City KS 145,786 0.154 
83. Salem OR 154,637 0.150 
84. Eugene OR 156,185 0.150 
85. Amarillo TX 190,695 0.147 
86. Glendale AZ 226,721 0.147 
87. Chattanooga TN 167,674 0.144 
88. South Bend IN 101,168 0.136 
89. Decatur IL 76,122 0.134 
90. Columbia SC 129,272 0.133 
91. Fresno CA 494,665 0.129 
92. Houston TX 2,099,451 0.118 
93. Oxnard CA 197,899 0.112 
94. Anaheim CA 336,265 0.112 
95. Fort Lauderdale FL 165,521 0.105 
96. Topeka KS 127,473 0.095 
97. Evansville IN 117,429 0.095 
98. Midland TX 111,147 0.094 
99. Boulder CO 97,385 0.091 
100. Plano TX 259,841 0.085 
101. Provo UT 112,488 0.084 
102. Ann Arbor MI 113,934 0.081 
103. Portland OR 583,776 0.081 
104. Mesquite TX 139,824 0.076 
105. Des Moines IA 203,433 0.076 
106. Lansing MI 114,297 0.075 
107. San Bernardino CA 209,924 0.071 
108. Tulsa OK 391,906 0.071 
109. Beaumont TX 118,296 0.068 
110. Shreveport LA 199,311 0.067 
111. Colorado Springs CO 416,427 0.062 
112. Carrollton TX 119,097 0.062 
113. Orange CA 136,416 0.061 
114. Tampa FL 335,709 0.061 
115. Lakewood CO 142,980 0.060 
116. Spokane WA 208,916 0.060 
117. St. Petersburg FL 244,769 0.057 
118. San Buenaventura CA 106,433 0.056 
119. Sioux City IA 82,684 0.055 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Author’s Calculations. 
 
